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Abstract
We introduce the concept of access-based intuitionistic knowledgewhich
relies on the intuition that agent i knows ϕ if i has found access to a proof
of ϕ. Basic principles are distribution and factivity of knowledge as well as
ϕ→ Kiϕ andKi(ϕ∨ψ)→ (Kiϕ∨Kiψ), whereϕ reads ‘ϕ is proved’.
The formalization extends a family of classical modal logics designed in [Le-
witzka 2015, 2017, 2019] as combinations of IPC and CPC and as systems
for the reasoning about proof, i.e. intuitionistic truth. We adopt a formal-
ization of common knowledge from [Lewitzka 2011] and interpret it here as
access-based common knowledge. We compare our proposal with recent ap-
proaches to intuitionistic knowledge [Artemov and Protopopescu 2016; Le-
witzka 2017, 2019] and bring together these different concepts in a unifying
semantic framework based on Heyting algebra expansions.
1 Introduction
Our investigation is inspired by recent approaches to a formal concept of intu-
itionistic knowledge, i.e. formalizations of knowledge that are in accordance with
intuitionistic or constructive reasoning. In particular, we consider Intuitionistic
Epistemic Logic IEL introduced by Artemov and Protopopescu [2] where intu-
itionistic knowledge is explained as the product of verification. Some principles
of that approach are adopted by Lewitzka [11] and incorporated into a family of
modal systems L3–L5 originally introduced in [10]. The resulting epistemic log-
ics are systems for the reasoning about intuitionistic truth, i.e. proof, and a kind
of intuitionistic knowledge based on an informal notion of justification (cf. [12]).
In the present paper, we extend modal logic L5 with the purpose of formalizing
a new concept of constructive knowledge which, in our multi-agent setting, relies
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on the intuition that agent i knows ϕ if i has gained access to a proof of ϕ. This
paradigma also admits a concept of common knowledge that we adopt from [8]
and interpret here constructively. The basic motivation behind this access-based
concept is the idea that to know ϕ, in a constructive sense, means something like
to understand, to become aware of, to effect, ... a proof of proposition ϕ (or, if one
prefers, a solution to problem ϕ), and that the agent possibly has to spent some
effort and ressources to execute this activity. We feel that the intuition of finding
access to a proof of ϕ captures those ideas in some abstract way. In the follow-
ing, we shortly discuss the above mentioned concepts of intuitionistic knowledge
found in the literature and then present the notion of access-based knowledge. In
the subsequent sections, we shall see that all three concepts can be formalized and
studied within a unifying framework of algebraic (and relational) semantics.
1.1 Verification-based knowledge: Artemov and Protopopescu 2016
Artemov and Protopopescu [2] propose an intuitionistic concept of knowledge
which is in accordance with the proof-reading semantics of intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic IPC , i.e. with well-known Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK)
interpretation. Knowledge is viewed as the product of a verification. The intu-
itive notion of verification generalizes proof as intuitionistic truth in the sense that
a proof is ‘the strictest kind of a verification’. Kϕ means that it is verified that
proposition ϕ holds intuitionistically, i.e. there is evidence that ϕ has a proof (even
if a concrete proof is not delivered nor specified in the process of verification).
Under this interpretation, the following principles hold and represent an axiomati-
zation of IEL in the language of IPC augmented with knowledge operator K:
(i) all schemes of theorems of IPC
(ii) K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ) (distribution of knowledge)
(iii) ϕ→ Kϕ (co-reflection)
(iv) Kϕ→ ¬¬ϕ (intuitionistic reflection)
Note that (iv) reads ‘Known (i.e. verified) propositions cannot be proved to
be false’. Since the process of verification, in general, does not deliver a concrete
proof, the classical reflection principle (factivity of knowledge) Kϕ → ϕ is not
valid. Modus Ponens is the unique inference rule of the resulting deductive system.
It is shown in [2] that IEL is sound and complete w.r.t. a possible-worlds semantics.
Although the notion of verification is only intuitively given in IEL, it is shown by
Protopopescu [14] that also an arithmetical interpretation can be provided.
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1.2 Adopting a justification-based view: Lewitzka 2017, 2019
Logic L5 was introduced in [10] together with a hierarchy L ( L3 ( L4 ( L5 of
classical Lewis-style modal logics for the reasoning about intuitionistic truth, i.e.
proof. A formula ϕ reads ‘ϕ is proved (i.e. ϕ has an actual proof)’. Semantics is
given by a class of Heyting algebras where intuitionistic truth is represented by the
top element of the Heyting lattice, and classical truth is modeled by a designated
ultrafilter. Formulas of the form
(1) ϕ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤)
are theorems and express that  is a predicate for intuitionistic truth: ϕ is clas-
sically true iff ϕ holds intuitionistically (i.e. ϕ denotes the top element of the
underlying Heyting algebra). An essential feature is the definability of an identity
connective by ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ ↔ ψ) such that the identity axioms of R. Suszko’s
basic non-Fregean logic, the Sentential Calculus with Identity SCI (cf. [5]), are
satisfied:1
(i) ϕ ≡ ϕ
(ii) (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ↔ ψ)
(iii) ϕ ≡ ψ → χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ].2
ϕ ≡ ψ reads ‘ϕ and ψ have the same meaning (denotation, Bedeutung)’. We
refer to the axioms (i)–(iii) as the axioms of propositional identity, and particularly
to (iii) as the Substitution Principle (SP). Since these axioms are theorems of our
modal systems, we are dealing with specific classical non-Fregean logics which
essentially means that the ‘Fregean Axiom’ (ϕ ↔ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ) does not hold,
i.e. formulas with the same truth value may have different meanings. That is, the
denotation of a formula is generally more than a truth value: it is a proposition,
i.e. an element of a given model. Actually, all our logics extending L5 are specific
non-Fregean theories with the property that for any formulas ϕ,ψ: ϕ ≡ ψ is a
theorem iff ϕ↔ ψ is intuitionistically valid, i.e. valid in standard BHK semantics
extended by proof-interpretation clauses for additional operators. Thus, in any
model, intuitionistically equivalent formulas denote the same proposition whereas
formulas such as ϕ and ¬¬ϕ have, in general, different meanings. This determines,
in a sense, the ‘degree of intensionality’ of our logics. The highest degree of this
kind of intensionality is achieved in Suszko’s SCI where for all formulas ϕ, ψ it
holds that ϕ ≡ ψ is a theorem iff ϕ = ψ.
1In SCI , the identity connective is a primitive symbol of the object language.
2ϕ[x := ψ] is the result of substituting ψ for any occurrence of variable x in ϕ.
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A further feature of our modal systems is that they contain a copy of IPC and
thus combine IPC with classical propositional logic CPC in the following precise
sense. If Φ ∪ {ϕ} is a set of formulas in the propositional language of IPC , then
(2) Φ ⊢IPC ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢L ϕ,
where Φ := {ψ | ψ ∈ Φ}. In particular, for any propositional formula ϕ,
ϕ is a theorem of IPC iff ϕ is a theorem of system L. That is, ϕ 7→ ϕ is a
‘translation’, actually an embedding, of IPC into classical modal logic L, cf. [10]
(L can be replaced here with any member of the hierarchy L ⊆ L3 ⊆ L4 ⊆ L5 ⊆
‘epistemic extensions’). Obviously, this embedding of IPC into classical modal
systems is simpler than the well-known standard translation of IPC into modal
logic S4 due to Go¨del. We argued in [12] that the S5-style system L5 is an ade-
quate system for reasoning about proof showing that it is complete w.r.t. extended
BHK semantics, i.e. w.r.t. intuitionistic reasoning. This semi-formal result is for-
mally confirmed by soundness and completeness of L5w.r.t. a relational semantics
based on intuitionistic general frames, cf. [12]. For this reason, we consider here
L5 as the basis of our epistemic extensions. In [11], we extended L5 to the epis-
temic logic EL5 taking into account principles coming from IEL. EL5 is further
studied in [12] where its algebraic semantics is complemented by relational seman-
tics. EL5 can be axiomatized in the following way:
(INT) All formulas which have the form of an IPC -tautology
(i) (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ϕ ∨ψ)
(ii) ϕ→ ϕ
(iii) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(iv) ϕ→ ϕ
(v) ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ
(vi) Kϕ→ ¬¬ϕ (intuitionistic reflection)
(vii) K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ)
(viii) ϕ→ Kϕ (weak co-reflection)3
(TND) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ (tertium non datur)
The reference rules are Modus Ponens (MP) and Intuitionistic Axiom Necessi-
tation (AN): ‘If ϕ is an intuitionistically acceptable axiom, i.e. any axiom distinct
from (TND), then infer ϕ.’ Actually, we argued in [12] that all schemes (i)–(viii)
above are intuitionistically acceptable, i.e. sound w.r.t. BHK semantics extended
by constructive interpretations of the modal and epistemic operators, respectively.
3Replacing this scheme with ϕ→ Kϕ results in a deductively equivalent system.
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Logic L5 is axiomatized by (INT), (i)–(v) and (TND) along with the same infer-
ence rules where, again, (AN) applies to all axioms but (TND).
Notice that in the more expressive modal language, we are able to weaken the
original axiom of co-reflection from IEL. Of course, the resulting formalization
of knowledge then no longer captures the notion of verification as axiomatized in
IEL. Instead, we proposed in [12] to consider an informal notion of justification
or reason to motivate the new formalization.4 Accordingly, we suppose that ϕ is
known by the agent if he has an epistemic justification, reason for ϕ. What the
agent recognizes or accepts as an epistemic justification depends essentially from
its internal conditions, reasoning capabilities, convictions, etc. Contrary to the
more objective and agent-invariant concept of verification, the notion of justifica-
tion is agent-dependent. We postulate that the agent recognizes at least all actual
proofs, i.e. all effected constructions, as epistemic justifications. This ensures the
validity of weak co-reflection (viii). However, a possible proof as a potential, non-
effected construction is, in general, not accepted by the agent as a reason for his
knowledge. Full co-reflection in its original form ϕ→ Kϕ must be rejected under
this justification-based view.
Of course, a justification does not constitute a proof: classical reflection (fac-
tivity of knowledge), Kϕ → ϕ, must be rejected. Nevertheless, if the agent has
an epistemic justification of proposition ϕ, then ϕ cannot be proved to be false, i.e.
¬¬ϕ holds intuitionistically. Therefore, intuitionistic reflection (vi) from IEL is
adopted. We also assume that if the agent has justifications for ϕ → ψ and for ϕ,
respectively, then he obtains a justification for ψ.5 Thus, we adopt distribution of
knowledge, axiom (vii) above, too.
1.3 Access-based knowledge
We propose here a concept of constructive knowledge which relies on the intuition
that an agent knows a proposition ϕ if he has found an access to a proof of ϕ.
In some specific context, ‘to find an access to a proof’ may be interpreted as ‘to
understand a proof’, ‘to become aware of a proof’, etc. We consider a multi-agent
scenario based on the following ontological assumptions (see also [12]):
We are given a universe of possible proofs, i.e. a universe of potential construc-
tions, mathematical possibilities. The creative subject6 establishes the intuitionis-
4There is a family of sophisticated Justification Logics found in the literature (see, e.g., [1] for an
overview) where justifications along with operations on them are explicitly formalized. These aspects
are not contained in logic EL5. Instead, the notion of justification is understood in a primitive and
completely informal and unspecified way.
5This is an established principle in Justification Logics with a precise formalization, cf. [1].
6This term was used by Brouwer and we adopt it here four our short, informal explanation.
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tic truth of propositions by effecting constructions. These effected constructions
are the actual proofs among the possible proofs, i.e., the established intuitionistic
truths. The universe of possible proofs exists objectively and can be explored by
reasoning subjects.7 A possible proof may be a hypothetical, potential construc-
tion, not necessarily effected by the creative subject. It can be conceived as a set
of conditions on a construction rather than the construction itself (cf. [3, 4]). We
expect that these conditions are not in conflict with effected constructions, i.e. they
are ‘consistent’ with the actual proofs. There is a set I = {1, ..., N} of N ≥ 1
agents distinct from the creative subject. Each agent can obtain knowledge by ac-
cessing possible proofs, where ‘accessing a proof’ is a constructive procedure or
activity that any agent is able to carry out, possibly by spending some effort and
resources. A (possible) proof of the proposition “agent i knows ϕ” is given by a
(possible) proof of ϕ along with an access to that proof found by i. Actual proofs,
i.e. the constructions effected by the creative subject, are immediately available
and thus trivially accessible. That is, each agent’s knowledge comprises at least
intuitionistic truth established by the creative subject. Finally, there is a designated
subset of possible proofs that determines the facts, i.e. the ‘classical truths’.
By the proof predicate on the object language, we may explicitly distinguish
between actual proofs and non-effected, possible proofs. As before, ϕ reads
classically ‘ϕ has an actual proof (i.e. ϕ is proved)’, and ♦ϕ := ¬¬ϕ reads ‘ϕ
has a possible proof’.8 In [12], we extended standard BHK interpretation by the
following clause for the modal operator:
• A proof of ϕ consists in presenting an actual proof of ϕ.9
Since actual proofs are effected, available constructions, every agent i ∈ I has
the same immediate, trivial access to them. We denote this unique, trivial access
by s0. It might be regarded as an access created by the ‘empty action’ (no effort
must be spent). On the other hand, if some proof t is accessed via s0, then t must
be an actual proof. That is, we postulate the following:
• The proofs accessed via s0 (by any agent) are exactly the actual proofs.
7Since we are reasoning about proof in classical logic, i.e. from a classical point of view, we
adopt a platonist perspective which we combine with the constructive approach. Notice that the
BHK interpretation of implication implicitly contains a universal quantification: ‘A proof of ϕ→ ψ
consists in a construction u such that for all proofs t: if t is a proof of ϕ, then u(t) is a proof of ψ’.
The range of that universal quantifier is the given universe of possible proofs.
8Of course, ϕ→ ♦ϕ is a theorem of the Lewis-style systems L ⊆ L3 ⊆ L4 ⊆ L5, cf. [12].
9We assume that the presentation of an actual proof of ϕ involves some proof-checking procedure
which depends only from the given actual proof itself and from ϕ.
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We establish the following proof-interpretation clause for the knowledge oper-
ator:
• A proof of Kiϕ is a tuple (s, t), where s is an access, found by agent i, to a
proof t of proposition ϕ.
If (s, t) is a proof ofKiϕ, then we write also (si, t) instead of (s, t) in order to
emphasize the involved agent. Note that for any i ∈ I and any proposition ϕ, (s0, t)
is a proof ofKiϕ iff t is an actual proof of ϕ. Then the principles Kiϕ→ ϕ and
ϕ→ Kiϕ are intuitionistically acceptable. In fact, given the presentation of an
actual proof of Kiϕ, that actual proof must be of the form (s, t), where s is an
access to the actual proof t of ϕ (thus s = s0 is the trivial access). The construction
that maps (s, t) to t yields a proof of the former principle. This also shows that any
actual proof of a formula Kiϕ is of the form (s0, t), where t is an actual proof
of ϕ. Now, one recognizes that the construction that for any actual proof t of ϕ
returns the tuple (s0, t) gives rise to a proof of the latter principle. Consequently,
(Kiϕ→ ϕ) and(ϕ→ Kiϕ) are sound w.r.t. extended BHK semantics,
i.e. Kiϕ ≡ ϕ. Of course, Kiϕ and ϕ denote generally different propositions.
It is clear that from a (possible) proof (si, t) ofKiϕ, the (possible) proof t of ϕ
can be extracted. This procedure yields a proof of Kiϕ → ϕ. Hence, classical re-
flection (factivity of knowledge) is intuitionistically acceptable. On the other hand,
intuitionistic reflection ϕ→ Kiϕ, an axiom of verification-based knowledge, must
be rejected (for similar reasons as it is rejected in the justification-based approach
discussed above). In fact, given a (possible) proof t of ϕ, we cannot expect that
agent i has gained any access to t, there is no logical evidence for such an access.
The access-based approach validates the following disjunction property of knowl-
edge: Ki(ϕ ∨ ψ) → (Kiϕ ∨ Kiψ). A BHK proof derives immediately from the
clauses forKi and disjunction. We postulate the following two Combination Prin-
ciples:
(C1) If s is an access to proof t, and s′ is an access to proof u, and t is a con-
struction converting u into the proof t(u), then any agent which has gained both
accesses s and s′ is able to create a combined access s + s′ to proof t(u). We
assume that s0 + s = s = s+ s0, for any access s and the trivial access s0.
(C2) If t is an access to proof u, and s is an access to proof (t, u), then a
composed access s ◦ t to proof u can be found. That is, if (tj, u) is a proof and
(si, (tj, u)) is a proof, then ((s ◦ t)i, u) is a proof. We assume that s ◦ s = s, for
any access s.
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(C1) warrants intuitionistic validity of Ki(ϕ → ψ) → (Kiϕ → Kiψ). A
proof is given by the construction that for any proof (s, t) of Ki(ϕ → ψ) returns
the function mapping any proof (s′, u) of Kiϕ to the proof (s + s
′, t(u)) of Kiψ.
Principle (C2) warrants the following intuitive epistemic law: ‘If i knows that j
knows ϕ, then i knows ϕ’. That is,KiKjϕ→ Kiϕ is intuitionistically acceptable.
As usual, the fact that everyone in group G = {i1, ..., ik} knows ϕ is expressed
by the formula EGϕ := Ki1ϕ∧ ...∧Kikϕ. Recall that E
n
Gϕ is recursively defined
by E0Gϕ := ϕ and E
k+1
G ϕ := EGE
k
Gϕ, for k ≥ 0. Also recall that knowledge
distributes over conjunction. The concept of ‘ϕ is common knowledge among the
agents of group G’, notation: CGϕ, is often informally defined as follows:
(3) CGϕ⇔
∧
n∈N
EnGϕ
That is, CGϕ is true iff the infinitely many formulas ϕ, EGϕ, E
2
Gϕ, ... are true.
However, standard formalizations found in the literature (see, e.g., [7, 13]) involve
additionally properties that go beyond that basic intuition. In fact, standard possible
worlds semantics of epistemic logic with common knowledge validates also the
following introspection principle as a theorem of standard axiomatizations:
(4) CGϕ→ CGCGϕ (introspection of common knowledge)
But if we take (3) seriously and understand common knowledge as such an in-
finite conjunction, then principle (4) does not necessarily follow. Of course, in
many ‘natural’ situations, such as the popular example of the moody children (cf.
[7, 13]), common knowledge arises at once after some finite amount of communica-
tion steps, and one may regard (4) as an evident principle in those cases. However,
one may construct examples where common knowledge is actually attained in an
infinite process of communication steps. In [7], p. 416, for instance, an unrealistic
version of the well-known coordinated-attack problem is discussed. If the messen-
ger between the two generals is able to double his speed every time around, and
his first journey takes one hour, then it follows that after exactly two hours he has
visited both camps an infinite number of times delivering each time the message
“attack at down” sent from the other general, and the generals will finally be able
to carry out a coordinated attack because they have attained common knowledge.
We may state that after the two hours of infinitely many journeys, each of the two
generals knows that EnGϕ, for every natural n (where ϕ is the delivered message).
However, we cannot conclude that the generals do know the infinite collection of
facts {EnGϕ | n ∈ N} as a single proposition
∧
n∈NE
n
Gϕ. In fact, new knowl-
edge is attained after each finite number of communication steps between the two
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agents, but there is no further communication beyond the limit step. This example
shows that if CGϕ is attained (possibly by an infinite number of steps), we cannot
expect in general that alsoKiCGϕ holds for i ∈ G. Thus, principle (4) is not valid.
However, under the assumption that in all known natural situations where com-
mon knowledge arises, it arises in a similar way as in the example of the moody
children, we may accept (4) as an additional axiom. Since our modeling deviates
from the possible worlds approach, we are able to treat both versions of common
knowledge: the basic one which is given by an infinite conjunction in the form of
(3), and the stronger version which extends the basic version by the introspection
principle (4). The axiomatization and semantic modeling of the basic version of
common knowledge is adopted from [8] where it was originally developed in a
general, classical non-Fregean setting. We add here principle (4) and provide a
constructive, access-based interpretation which proves to be sound w.r.t. our ex-
tended BHK semantics. We are not able to represent the infinite conjunction of (3)
in our object language by a fixed-point axiom or similar solutions working in stan-
dard possible worlds semantics. Instead, we propose a semantic characterization
by means of intended models, a solution that we shall discuss in some detail in the
last section.
Definition 1.1. Let G be a group and let t be a (possible) proof. We call an access
s to t a common access in G, or a G-common access, if the following hold:
(a) all agents of G have gained the same access s to t
(b) s is self-referential in G, i.e. for any i, j ∈ G and any proof u, if (si, u) is a
proof, then so is (sj, (si, u)).
The next result shows that the particular choice of proof t in Definition 1.1 is
not relevant.
Lemma 1.2. Let s be aG-common access to t. If some i ∈ G has access s to some
proof u, then s is also a G-common access to proof u.
Proof. If i ∈ G has the access s to proof u, then (si, u) is a proof. Since s is a
G-common access, item (b) of Definition 1.1 implies that (sj, (si, u)) is a proof,
for any j ∈ G. By composition principle (C2) above, ((s ◦ s)j, u) is a proof for
any j ∈ G. Also by (C2), s ◦ s = s. Thus, (sj, u) is a proof, for all j ∈ G. That is,
s is a G-common access to u.
Lemma 1.3. For any group G, the trivial access s0 is a G-common access (to any
actual proof).
Proof. Recall that the proofs accessed via s0 (by any agent) are exactly the actual
proofs. Thus, all agents have access s0 to any actual proof. If (s0, t) is a proof, for
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some proof t, then t and (s0, t)must be actual proofs. Thus, (s0, t) can be accessed
via s0 (by any agent). By Definition 1.1, s0 is a G-common access, for any G.
A proof-interpretation clause for CGϕ must take into account the respective
version of common knowledge. Let us first consider the basic version of common
knowledge given by the infinite conjunction expressed in (3) above. We consider
two proposals:
• A ‘proof’ of CGϕ consists in an infinite sequence of proofs (tn)n∈N such
that tn is a proof of E
n
Gϕ.
• A ‘proof’ of CGϕ consists in a proof t of ϕ together with a construction that
for a given proof of EnGϕ, n ≥ 0, returns a proof of EGE
n
Gϕ = E
n+1
G ϕ.
Unfortunately, both clauses are problematic from a constructivist point of view.
The first one describes a proof as an infinite object. The second one gives an
inductive definition of a construction that possibly needs an infinite amount of time
to produce all the different proofs of the infinitely many formulas EnGϕ, n ≥ 0. It
seems that any approach to the basic intuition (3) of common knowledge (without
introspection) involves some form of infinity that makes a constructive treatment
hard or impossible. Therefore, we will focus on the stronger, introspective version
of common knowledge which can be constructively described by the following
simple and finitary clause:
• A proof of CGϕ is a tuple (s, t), where t is a proof of ϕ and s is aG-common
access to t.
Example 1.4. We consider the introspective version of common knowledge. Imag-
ine a math lecture. The lecturer writes a proof of a theorem ϕ on the blackboard. It
is clear that at the end of the lecture, there is common knowledge of ϕ in the group
G of students who listened the lecture. We interpret the situation constructively in
the following way. Let s be the lecture and let t be the proof of ϕ written on the
blackboard. Then all students of group G share the same access s to t. Hence,
condition (a) of Definition 1.1 is satisfied. During the lecture, the students can see
each other listening the lecture. Thus, every student j ∈ G has access via s to the
proof (si, t) of Kiϕ, for any i ∈ G. This yields proofs (sj, (si, t)) of KjKiϕ, for
any j, i ∈ G, and so on ... . Of course, the same arguments apply to any other
statement ψ with proof u presented in lecture s. Then s is self-referential in G in
the sense of Definition 1.1, i.e. condition (b) holds true. Thus, s is a G-common
access to t, and (s, t) is a proof of CGϕ in the sense of the clause for CGϕ above.
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Next, we present some principles of common knowledge which are sound w.r.t.
extended BHK interpretation.
ϕ → CGϕ. Every agent has the trivial access s0 to an actual proof t of ϕ. We
already saw that s0 is self-referential in the group of all agents I . Consequently,
the function that maps any actual proof t of ϕ to the actual proof (s0, t) of CGϕ
gives rise to an actual proof of ϕ→ CGϕ.
CGϕ → CGKiϕ, i ∈ G. Suppose (s, t) is a proof of CGϕ. Then, in partic-
ular, (si, t) is a proof of Kiϕ. Since s is self-referential in G, (sj, (si, t)) is
a proof, for every j ∈ G. Thus, (s, (si, t)) is a proof of CGKiϕ. Then the
mapping (s, t) 7→ (s, (si, t)) is an effected construction, i.e. actual proof, for
CGϕ→ CGKiϕ.
CGϕ → CGCGϕ. Let (s, t) be a proof of CGϕ. Then s is a G-common access
to proof t of ϕ. In particular, s is self-referential in G. Thus, for some (for any)
j ∈ G, (sj, (s, t)) is a proof. Then by Lemma 1.2, s is a G-common access to
proof (s, t). By definition, (s(s, t)) then is a proof of CGCGϕ. Thus, the mapping
(s, t) 7→ (s(s, t)) represents an actual proof of CGϕ→ CGCGϕ.
(ϕ → ψ) → (CGϕ → CGψ). Let t be an actual proof of ϕ → ψ. Let (s, u)
be a proof of CGϕ. Then t converts u into a proof t(u) of ψ. Each i ∈ G has the
trivial access s0 to t, since t is an actual proof. And each i ∈ G has the access s to
proof u. By combination principle (C1), each i ∈ G gains the access s0 + s = s
to proof t(u). By Lemma 1.2, s then is also a G-common access to t(u). Thus,
(s, t(u)) is a proof of CGψ. Of course, the function ft : (s, u) 7→ (s, t(u)) is an
effected construction, i.e. an actual proof. Then the construction that for any actual
proof t of ϕ→ ψ returns a presentation (including proof-checking) of function ft,
constitutes an actual proof of (ϕ→ ψ)→ (CGϕ→ CGψ).
Finally, we show thatKiϕ and CGϕ have exactly the same actual proofs, indepen-
dently of i and G. In fact, (s, t) is an actual proof of Kiϕ iff t is an actual proof
of ϕ and s = s0 iff t is an actual proof of ϕ and the trivial access s = s0 is a
G-common access to t iff (s, t) is an actual proof of CGϕ. This shows in particular
that the actual proofs (not all possible proofs) of ϕ, Kiϕ and CGϕ, respectively,
can be converted into each other, i.e. ϕ ≡ Kiϕ ≡ CGϕ holds for all i ∈ I
and all groups G.10 However, ϕ, Kiϕ and CGϕ will denote, in general, pairwise
distinct propositions.
2 The logics of access-based knowledge L5AC
−
N and L5
AC
N
We extend, in the following, system L5 by axioms for knowledge and common
knowledge in an augmented epistemic object language. As before, I = {1, ..., N}
10Cf. Lemma 2.3(b) below.
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is a fixed finite set of N ≥ 1 agents, and groups of agents are always non-empty
subsets G ⊆ I .
Definition 2.1. The object language is defined over the following set of symbols:
an infinite set of propositional variables V = {x0, x1, ...}, logical connectives ⊥,
¬, ∨, ∧, →, modal operator  and epistemic operators Ki, for i ∈ I , and CG,
for every group G of agents. Then the set of formulas Fm is the smallest set that
contains V ∪ {⊥} and is closed under the following conditions: ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm ⇒
¬ϕ, (ϕ ∗ψ), ϕ,Kiϕ, CGϕ ∈ Fm, where ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}, i ∈ I , G ⊆ I , G 6= ∅.
We use the following abbreviations: ⊤ := (⊥ → ⊥), ¬ϕ := (ϕ → ⊥),
(ϕ↔ ψ) := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ), ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ↔ ψ) (propositional identity),
♦ϕ := ¬¬ϕ.
We consider the following axiom schemes:
(INT) any scheme which has the form of an IPC -tautology11
(i) (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ϕ ∨ψ)
(ii) ϕ→ ϕ
(iii) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(iv) ϕ→ ϕ
(v) ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ
(vi) Kiϕ→ ϕ (reflection, factivity of knowledge)
(vii) Ki(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kiϕ→ Kiψ)
(viii) Ki(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (Kiϕ ∨Kiψ)
(ix) CG(ϕ→ ψ)→ (CGϕ→ CGψ)
(x) CG(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (CGϕ ∨ CGψ) (only for introspective common knowledge)
(xi) ϕ→ CGϕ
(xii) CGϕ→ Kiϕ, for any i ∈ G
(xiii) CGϕ→ CGKiϕ, for any i ∈ G
(xiv) CGϕ→ CG′ϕ, for any non-empty G
′ ⊆ G
(xv) CGϕ→ CGCGϕ (for introspective common knowledge)
(TND) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
Except of (TND), all schemes above are intuitionistically acceptable in the
sense that they are sound w.r.t. extended BHK semantics considering the access-
based interpretation of epistemic operators. For most of the epistemic axioms, this
is shown in the last section. In [12], we saw that the modal axioms, in particular
(iv) and (v), are sound w.r.t. extended BHK semantics. For the convenience of the
11It would be sufficient to fix here a finite set of schemes that axiomatize IPC .
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reader, we recall here the argumentation. Before, we show that
(5) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
is intuitionistically acceptable.12 Of course, either there is an actual proof of ϕ or
there is no such proof. Since an actual proof is immediately available, it can be
decided which one of the two alternatives is the case. In the former case, that ac-
tual proof is available and can be presented (proof-checked). This yields an actual
proof ofϕ. In the latter case, we conclude thatϕ has no possible proof at all. In
fact, any (possible) proof ofϕwould, by the BHK clause, involve an actual proof
of ϕ which, by hypothesis, does not exist. Thus, the identity function on proofs, as
an effected construction, constitutes an actual proof of ϕ→ ⊥, i.e. of ¬ϕ. We
have shown that for any proposition ϕ, either we can present an actual proof ofϕ
or we can present an actual proof of ¬ϕ, and we are able to indicate which one
of the two alternatives is the case. Thus, (5) is intuitionistically valid.
Soundness of (iv) ϕ → ϕ. Suppose we are given a proof s of ϕ. By
definition, s consists in the presentation of an actual proof t of ϕ. The presentation
(including proof-checking) depends only from the actual proof t and from ϕ and
no further hypotheses. Thus, s is itself an effected construction, an actual proof.
The presentation of s as an actual proof of ϕ yields an actual proof u of ϕ.
Thus, the construction that converts s into u is an actual proof of ϕ→ ϕ.13
Soundness of (v) ¬ϕ → ¬ϕ. Suppose s is a proof of ¬ϕ. Then
¬ϕ (i.e. ϕ → ⊥) must have an actual proof for otherwise, by (5) above,
ϕ would have an actual proof contradicting that ¬ϕ has proof s. But then we
may present a witness of an actual proof of ϕ→ ⊥, namely the identity function
on proofs which is, trivially, an effected construction. Its presentation (including
proof-checking) results in an actual proof t of ¬ϕ. We have presented a con-
struction that for any possible proof s of ¬ϕ returns a proof t of ¬ϕ.
Recall that our basic logic for the reasoning about proof L5 is given by the ax-
iom schemes (INT), (i)–(v) and (TND) plus the inference rules of Modus Ponens
(MP) and Intuitionistic Axiom Necessitation (AN): ‘If ϕ is an intuitionistically ac-
ceptable axiom, i.e. any axiom distinct from (TND), then infer ϕ.’ We define
L5ACN as the multi-agent logic of access-based knowledge and introspective com-
mon knowledge with N ≥ 1 agents.14 L5ACN is given by L5 + (vi)–(xv). That is,
12Actually, (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) is a theorem of L5, cf. Theorem 3.7(vii) in [12].
13This shows in particular that any possible proof of ϕ must be an actual proof of ϕ which is
in accordance with the fact that ♦ϕ→ ϕ is a theorem of L5, cf. Theorem 3.7(v) in [12].
14Letter ‘A’ refers to ‘access-based knowledge’ while ‘C’ stands for ‘common knowledge’.
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L5ACN is axiomatized by the complete list of axioms above along with the rules of
(MP) and (AN). The logic L5AC
−
N is given in the same way as L5
AC
N but without
the schemes (x) and (xv). L5AC
−
N is intended to formalize access-based common
knowledge as an infinite conjunction according to (3) without introspection. Ob-
viously, both L5ACN and L5
AC−
N are super-logics of L5. As usual, we define a
derivation of ϕ from a set Φ as a finite sequence of formulas ϕ0, ..., ϕn = ϕ such
that each member of the sequence is an axiom, an element of Φ or the result of an
application of the rules of (MP) or (AN) to formulas occurring at preceding posi-
tions. Recall that (AN) only applies to axioms of the underlying system that are
different from tertium non datur.
Lemma 2.2. For any formulas ϕ, ψ, the following hold in all systems extending
L5:
(a) If ϕ is a theorem derivable without (TND), then ϕ is a theorem.
(b) The Deduction Theorem holds.
(c) The Substitution Principle (SP) holds: ϕ ≡ ψ → χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ].
The following are theorems:
(d) ϕ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤) and ϕ ≡ (ϕ ≡ ⊤)
(e) (ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ (ϕ ∧ψ) and (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ (ϕ ∨ψ)
(f) (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
(g) ¬¬ϕ ≡ ϕ and ¬(ϕ ∧ψ) ≡ (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
(h) (ϕ ≡ ⊤) ∨ (ϕ ≡ ⊥)
(i) (ϕ→ ♦ϕ) and (♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ)
(j) (♦(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (♦ϕ ∨ ♦ψ))
Proof. (a) and (b) can be shown by induction on the length of derivations.
(c): Roughly speaking, it is enough to show that propositional identity is a congru-
ence relation on Fm. (SP) then follows by induction on χ. This is shown for the
logical connectives, the modal operator and the knowledge operator in [9, 10, 11].
We consider here only the new operator of common knowledge. We must show
that (ϕ ≡ ψ) → (CGϕ ≡ CGψ) is a theorem scheme. By axioms (xi), (ix), (ii)
and propositional calculus, we get (ϕ ↔ ψ) → (CGϕ ↔ CGψ). By item (a),
distribution and axiom (ii), we obtain the assertion.
(d): The first part of (d) is originally shown in [9] for sublogic L. We present here
a simpler derivation: 1. (ϕ ≡ ⊤) ⊢ (⊤ → ϕ); 2. (ϕ ≡ ⊤) ⊢ ⊤ → ϕ, by
distribution and (MP); 3. (ϕ ≡ ⊤) ⊢ ⊤, by (AN); 4. (ϕ ≡ ⊤) ⊢ ϕ, by (MP);
5. ⊢ (ϕ ≡ ⊤) → ϕ, by Deduction Theorem; 6. ⊢ (ϕ → (⊤ → ϕ)), by (AN);
7. ⊢ ϕ → (⊤ → ϕ), by distribution and (MP); 8. ⊢ (ϕ → (ϕ → ⊤)), by
(AN); 9. ⊢ ϕ→ (ϕ→ ⊤), by distribution and (MP); 10. ⊢ ϕ→ ϕ ≡ ⊤, by
7. and 9.; 12. ⊢ ϕ ↔ ϕ ≡ ⊤, by 5. and 9. This shows the first part of (d). The
second part now follows by item (a).
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(e): Consider the intuitionistic tautologies (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ϕ and (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ψ, apply
rule (AN), distribution, intuitionistic propositional calculus. The other way round,
consider the intuitionistic tautology ϕ→ (ψ → (ϕ∧ψ)), apply (AN), distribution
and intuitionistic propositional calculus. Finally, apply item (a). The second equa-
tion follows similarly using propositional calculus and axiom (i).
(f): This result is originally proved in [12], Theorem 3.7(vii).
(g): Use (f), i.e. ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, and propositional calculus. Actually, by (a), it is
enough to show that ¬¬ϕ → ϕ and ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) → (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) derive
without (TND).
(h): Using (f) and axiom (i), one derives ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. Then (d) along with
propositional caluclus yields (ϕ ≡ ⊤) ∨ (ϕ ≡ ⊥).
(i): From ϕ → ¬¬ϕ and the contraposition of theorem ¬ϕ → ¬ϕ we derive
ϕ→ ♦ϕ without using (TND). Now, apply item (a). The second assertion is clear
by scheme (v) and item (a).
(j): By (e), (¬ϕ∧¬ψ)→ (¬ϕ∧¬ψ) is a theorem. Observe that ¬(ϕ∨ψ) ≡
(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) is a theorem since ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) is an intuitionistic tautol-
ogy. By the Substitution Principle (SP), we may replace ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ by ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
in every context. Hence, (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) → ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) is a theorem and so is its
contrapositive ¬¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ ¬(¬ϕ ∧¬ψ). Then by the second assertion of
(g), we derive ¬¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) → (¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ψ), i.e. ♦(ϕ ∨ ψ) → (♦ϕ ∨ ♦ψ).
Note that (TND) does not occur in the derivations. Thus, we may apply item (a)
and obtain (j).
Lemma 2.3. The following are theorems of L5ACN and of L5
AC−
N :
(a) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kiϕ→ Kiψ) and (ϕ→ ψ)→ (CGϕ→ CGψ)
(b) ϕ ≡ Kiϕ and ϕ ≡ CGϕ
(c) Ki(ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ (Kiϕ ∧Kiψ) and Ki(ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ (Kiϕ ∨Kiψ)
(d) (KiKjϕ→ Kiϕ)
Moreover, axiom scheme (xiii) is redundant in L5ACN , i.e. it is derivable from the
remaining axioms.
Proof. (a): (ϕ → ψ) → CG(ϕ → ψ) is an instance of scheme (xi). Now,
consider (ix) and (iii) along with applications of rules (AN) and (MP). This yields
the second assertion of (a). Using (xi) and (xii), one derives ϕ → Kiϕ. Thus,
(ϕ → ψ) → Ki(ϕ → ψ) is a theorem. The first assertion of (a) now follows
in a similar way as the second one.
(b): The derivations ofϕ↔ Kiϕ andϕ↔ CGϕ are straightforward. Now,
(b) follows by Lemma 2.2 (a).
(c): We show the second assertion. Ki(ϕ ∨ ψ) → (Kiϕ ∨ Kiψ) is a theorem by
scheme (viii). ϕ → (ϕ ∨ ψ) is an intuitionistic tautology, thus (ϕ → (ϕ ∨ ψ))
is a theorem. Now, one easily derives Ki(ϕ → (ϕ ∨ ψ)). Then, by distribution of
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knowledge, Kiϕ → Ki(ϕ ∨ ψ) is a theorem. Applying Lemma 2.2 (a) yields the
second assertion of (c). The proof of the first assertion of (c) is straightforward.
(d): Kjϕ→ ϕ is an instance of scheme (vi). By (AN),(Kjϕ→ ϕ) is a theorem.
Then the first part of (a), together with (MP), yields (KiKjϕ→ Kiϕ).
Finally, we prove the last assertion. By (a), (CGϕ → Kiϕ) → (CGCGϕ →
CGKiϕ) is a theorem. By scheme (xii), (AN) and (MP), CGCGϕ → CGKiϕ is a
theorem. This, thogether with scheme (xv), yields scheme (xiii) CGϕ → CGKiϕ.
By Lemma 2.2 (a), we may apply (AN) to that formula. This shows that L5ACN
without scheme (xiii) is equivalent to L5ACN .
15
3 Algebraic semantics
It is well-known that the class of all Heyting algebras constitutes a semantics for
IPC .16 A propositional formula ϕ evaluates to the top element of any given Heyt-
ing algebraH, under any assignment of elements ofH to propositional variables, if
and only if ϕ is a theorem of IPC . In this sense, the greatest element of any given
Heyting algebra represents intuitionistic truth, and we have strong completeness:
Φ ⊢IPC ϕ if and only if for any Heyting algebraH and any assignment γ ∈ H
V , if
Φ is intuitionistically true inH under γ, then so is ϕ. Recall that a Heyting algebra
is a bounded lattice such that for all elements a, b, the subset {c | f∧(a, c) ≤ b}
has a greatest element f→(a, b), called the relative pseudo-complement of a with
respect to b, where f∧ is the infimum (meet) operation and≤ is the lattice ordering.
For a Heyting algebra H, we use the notation H = (M,f∨, f∧, f⊥, f→), whereM
is the universe and f∨, f∧, f⊥, f→ are the usual operations for join, meet, least
element and relative pseudo-complement (implication), respectively. The greatest
element is given by f⊤ := f→(f⊥, f⊥), and the pseudo-complement (negation) of
m ∈ M is defined by f¬(m) := f→(m, f⊥). A subset F ⊆ M of the universe
M is called a filter if the following conditions are satisfied: f⊤ ∈ F ; and for any
m,m′ ∈M : ifm ∈ F and f→(m,m
′) ∈ F , then m′ ∈ F (cf. [6]). A filter F is a
proper filter if f⊥ /∈ F . A prime filter is a proper filter F such that f∨(m,m
′) ∈ F
implies m ∈ F or m′ ∈ F , for any m,m′ ∈ M . Finally, an ultrafilter is a max-
imal proper filter. Every ultrafilter satisfies for all elements m ∈ M : m ∈ U or
f¬(m) ∈ U . It follows that U mirrors the classical behaviour of logical connec-
tives and represents, in this sense, classical truth. In particular, every ultrafilter is
prime. Also recall that in any Heyting algebra, for any elements m,m′, the equiv-
alence m ≤ m′ ⇔ f→(m,m
′) = f⊤ holds true.
Furthermore, the following facts will be useful:
15Notice that the argument does not work in L5AC
−
N where scheme (xv) is not available.
16It is enough to consider Heyting algebras with the Disjunction Property as in Definition 3.2.
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Lemma 3.1. Let H be a Heyting algebra with universe M . Then the following
hold.
(i) Any proper filter is the intersection of all prime filters containing it.
(ii) Let P be a filter, and a, b ∈ M . Then f→(a, b) ∈ P iff for all prime filters
P ′ ⊇ P : a ∈ P ′ implies b ∈ P ′.
(iii) If the smallest filter {f⊤} is prime, then for all a, b ∈ M : a ≤ b iff for all
prime filters P : a ∈ P implies b ∈ P .
Proof. (i): Let F be a proper filter of H. For every a ∈ M r F , there is a prime
filter Pa containing F such that a /∈ Pa. In fact, by Zorn’s Lemma, there is an
ultrafilter with that property. Then F =
⋂
a/∈F Pa.
(ii): Let P be a prime filter, a, b ∈M . The left-to-right implication of the assertion
is clear by definition of a filter. Suppose f→(a, b) /∈ P . Consider Fa,P := {c ∈
M | f→(a, c) ∈ P}. We claim that Fa,P is a filter. Obviously, f⊤ ∈ Fa,P .
Suppose c ∈ Fa,P and f→(c, d) ∈ Fa,P , for c, d ∈ M . Then f→(a, c) ∈ P
and f→(a, f→(c, d)) ∈ P . Since ((x → y) ∧ (x → (y → z)) → (x → z)
is an intuitionistic tautology, we conclude that f→(a, d) ∈ P , whence d ∈ Fa,P
and Fa,P is a filter. Let c ∈ P . Of course, f∧(a, c) ≤ c. Since f→(a, c) is the
greatest element x such that f∧(a, x) ≤ c, it follows that c ≤ f→(a, c). Thus,
f→(a, c) ∈ P . That is, c ∈ Fa,P . We have shown: P ⊆ Fa,P . Obviously,
a ∈ Fa,P and, by hypothesis, b /∈ Fa,P . By (i), it follows that there is a prime filter
P ′ extending Fa,P such that a ∈ P
′ and b /∈ P ′. We have P ⊆ Fa,P ⊆ P
′. By
contraposition, the right-to-left implication of assertion (ii) follows.
(iii): Suppose {f⊤} is a prime filter. The equivalence a ≤ b⇔ f→(a, b) = f⊤ is a
well-known property of Heyting algebras. The assertion now follows from (ii).
Definition 3.2. A modelM is given by a Heyting algebra expansion
M = (M,TRUE , f∨, f∧, f⊥, f→, f, (fKi)i∈I , (fCG)∅ 6=G⊆I)
with universe M whose elements are called propositions, a designated ultrafilter
TRUE ⊆ M which is the set of classically true propositions, and additionally
unary operations f, fKi , fCG such that the following truth conditions are satis-
fied:
(i)M has the Disjunction Property: for allm,m′ ∈ M , f∨(m,m
′) = f⊤ implies
m = f⊤ orm
′ = f⊤. That is, the smallest filter {f⊤} is prime.
(ii) For allm ∈M :
f(m) =
{
f⊤, ifm = f⊤
f⊥, else
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(iii) For every prime filter F ⊆M , and for all i ∈ I and all groupsG, the following
conditions (a)–(e) are fulfilled:
(a) The set BELi(F ) := {m ∈M | fKi(m) ∈ F} is a filter.
(b) The set COMMONG(F ) := {m ∈M | fCG(m) ∈ F} is a filter.
(c) For every ultrafilter U ⊇ F : BELi (F ) ⊆ U ; in particular, BELi(F ) is a
proper filter and BELi(TRUE ) ⊆ TRUE .
(d) COMMONG(F ) ⊆ BELi(F ), whenever i ∈ G.
(e) For any m ∈ M : if m ∈ COMMONG(F ) then fKi(m) ∈ COMMONG(F ),
whenever i ∈ G.
(f) COMMONG(F ) ⊆ COMMONG′(F ), whenever G
′ ⊆ G.
Notice that the definition involves a relational structure given by the set of
prime filters which can be viewed as ‘worlds’ ordered by set-theoretical inclusion.
Actually, this yields a relational semantics based on intuitionistic general frames
(cf. [6]) with some additional structure regarding the epistemic ingredients. This
kind of relational semantics was explicitly defined and studied for the logics L5,
EL5 and IEL in [12] where also its equivalence to algebraic semantics is shown.
Considering Definition 3.2 above and following the constructions presented in [12],
that frame-based semantics extends straightforwardly to a semantics with common
knowledge equivalent to the algebraic conditions given in Definition 3.2. For space
reasons, we skip here the details. Intuitively, BELi(F ) is the set of propositions
known by agent i at ‘world’ F , and COMMONG(F ) is the set of propositions
that are common knowledge in G at ‘world’ F . Intuitionistic truth is represented
by ‘world’ {f⊤}, the smallest prime filter; and classical truth is determined by a
designated ‘maximal world’ TRUE . Observe that f(m) is true at ‘world’ F (i.e.
f(m) ∈ F ) iffm is true at the ‘root world’ {f⊤} iffm is true at all ‘worlds’ (i.e.
is contained in all prime filters). Thus, regarding the modal operator, we actually
have a S5-style Kripke model combined with the properties of an intuitionistic
Kripke model for constructive reasoning.
Lemma 3.3. LetM be a model. We have fKi(f⊤) = f⊤ = fCG(f⊤), for all i ∈ I
and all ∅ 6= G ⊆ I . Moreover, the operations fKi and fCG are monotonic onM ,
i.e. m ≤ m′ implies fKi(m) ≤ fKi(m
′) and fCG(m) ≤ fCG(m
′).
Proof. By truth condition (i), {f⊤} is a prime filter. Now, consider F = {f⊤}
and m = f⊤ in truth conditions (iii)(a) and (iii)(b). Then the first assertion of
the Lemma follows. Suppose m,m′ ∈ M and m ≤ m′. By Lemma 3.1(iii),
it is enough to show: fKi(m) ∈ F implies fKi(m
′) ∈ F , for all prime filters
F . Let F be a prime filter. Then fKi(m) ∈ F implies m ∈ BELi(F ) implies
m′ ∈ BELi(F ) implies fKi(m
′) ∈ F . The assertion regarding the operators fCG
follows similarly.
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Definition 3.4. LetM be a model. In the following, we consider the truth condi-
tions given in Definition 3.2.
• M is an L5AC
−
N -model if, instead of (iii)(c), the following stronger condition
(c)* is satisfied: For every prime filter F and every i ∈ I , BELi(F ) is a
prime filter and BELi(F ) ⊆ F .
• M is an L5ACN -model if condition (c)* holds, COMMONG(F ) is a prime
filter, for every prime filter F , and the following additional truth condition
(g) is fulfilled for every prime filter F , every group G and everym ∈M :
(g) Ifm ∈ COMMONG(F ), then fCG(m) ∈ COMMONG(F ).
• The Heyting algebra reduct ofM with ultrafilter TRUE and operators f
and fK (i.e. I = {1}, single-agent case) is called an EL5-model. Only the
conditions (i), (ii), and (iii)(a) and (c) are relevant.
• The Heyting algebra reduct ofM with ultrafilter TRUE and operator f is
called an L5-model. Of course, only the conditions (i) and (ii) are relevant.
• The Heyting algebra reduct of M with operator fK (single-agent case:
I = {1}) is said to be an algebraic IEL-model if the following additional
truth condition of intuitionistic co-reflection (IntCo) is satisfied:
(IntCo) F ⊆ BEL(F ), for every prime filter F , whereBEL(F ) := BEL1 (F ).
Besides that condition, only (i), (iii)(a) and (iii)(c) are relevant.
Algebraic semantics for L5 and EL5 is originally presented in [10] and [11,
12], respectively, in essentially the way as formulated in the next Theorem 3.5.
Algebraic semantics of IEL, in the form as presented in [11], is also described in
Theorem 3.5 below.
Theorem 3.5. A Heyting algebra expansion
M = (M,TRUE , f∨, f∧, f⊥, f→, f, (fKi)i∈I , (fCG)∅ 6=G⊆I)
with ingredients as before is a model in the sense of Definition 3.2 if and only if the
following conditions are fulfilled for allm,m′ ∈M , all i ∈ I and all groups G:
(A)M has the Disjunction Property
(B)
f(m) =
{
f⊤, ifm = f⊤
f⊥, else
(C) fKi(f→(m,m
′)) ≤ f→(fKi(m), fKi(m
′))
(D) fCG(f→(m,m
′)) ≤ f→(fCG(m), fCG(m
′))
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(E) fCG(m) ≤ fKi(m), whenever i ∈ G
(F) fCG(m) ≤ fCG(fKi(m)), whenever i ∈ G
(G) fCG(m) ≤ fCG′ (m), whenever G
′ ⊆ G
(H) fCG(f⊤) = f⊤
(I) fKi(m) ≤ f¬(f¬(m)).
–M is an L5AC
−
N -model if instead of (I) the stronger condition (I)* fKi(m) ≤ m
holds, and for allm,m′ ∈M : fKi(f∨(m,m
′)) ≤ f∨(fKi(m), fKi(m
′)).
–M is an L5ACN -model if it is an L5
AC−
N -model and for all m,m
′ ∈ M and all
groups G, fCG(f∨(m,m
′)) ≤ f∨(fCG(m), fCG(m
′)) and introspection of com-
mon knowledge fCG(m) ≤ fCG(fCG(m)) are satisfied.
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– The appropriate reduct of M is an EL5-model if we drop common knowledge
and consider the single agent case I = {1} and only the conditions (A), (B), (C)
and (I), and fK(f⊤) = f⊤ instead of (H)
– The appropriate reduct ofM is an L5-model if we exclude all epistemic ingredi-
ents and consider only the conditions (A), (B).
– The appropriate reduct of M is an IEL-model if we drop common knowledge,
consider the single agent case I = {1} and the condtions (A), (C), (I), and addi-
tionally (IntCo): m ≤ fK(m), for allm ∈M .
Theorem 3.5 is useful for model constructions. It hides the relational struc-
ture on prime theories which is often not relevant for the construction of an alge-
braic model. The proof of Theorem 3.5 is straightforward and relies essentially on
Lemma 3.1(iii) and filter properties.
Definition 3.6. Given a model M, an assignment is a function γ : V → M that
extends in the canonical way to an ‘homomorphism’ γ∗ : Fm → M . We simplify
notation and write γ instead of the uniquely determined γ∗. The tuple (M, γ) is
called an interpretation. We consider two kinds of satisfaction relations between
interpretations and formulas. IfM is an IEL-model, then we define
(M, γ) IEL ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) = f⊤,
where ϕ belongs here to the sublanguage Fme ⊆ Fm, i.e. the language of IEL.
If L ∈ {L5, EL5, L5AC
−
N , L5
AC
N } andM is an L-model, then we define
(M, γ) L ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ,
where ϕ is any formula of the underlying object language of the respective logic.
If the context it allows, we omit the index L. Of course, the satisfaction relations
extend to sets of formulas in the usual way.
17Note that introspection along with (E) and (I)* implies fCG(m) = fCG(fCG(m)). In this sense,
common knowledge is a fixed point. Also notice that (F) follows from introspection of common
knowledge, (E) and monotonicity of fCG .
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The relation of logical consequence is defined as usual. If L is one of the logics
IEL, L5, EL5, L5AC
−
N , L5
AC
N , and Φ ∪ {ϕ} is a set of formulas of the respective
object language, then Φ L ϕ :⇔ for every interpretation (M, γ), whereM is an
L-model, (M, γ) L Φ implies (M, γ) L ϕ.
4 Soundness and Completeness
We consider the logics IEL and L5ACN and show that they are sound and complete
w.r.t. their respective classes of algebraic models. Soundness and completeness of
L5AC
−
N , EL5 and L5 then follows similarly.
Theorem 4.1. For any Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fme, Φ ⊢IEL ϕ implies Φ IEL ϕ.
Proof. It is enough to show that all axioms of IEL are true, i.e. denote the top
element in every algebraic IEL-model under every assignment. This is clear for
formulas having the form of an intuitionistic tautology. The validity of the remain-
ing axioms follows from the conditions (C), (I) and (IntCo) of Theorem 3.5.
Weak completeness of IEL w.r.t. algebraic semantics is shown in [11]. For
the convenience of the reader, we outline here a proof which is based on the al-
ternative definition of algebraic IEL-models given in Definition 3.4. We consider
the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of IEL. Its elements are the equivalence classes ϕ
modulo logical equivalence in IEL, for ϕ ∈ Fme. By IPC and epistemic axioms
of IEL it follows that the operations f∗(ϕ,ψ) := ϕ ∗ ψ, ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}, f⊥ := ⊥
and fK(ϕ) := Kϕ are all well-defined. This yields a Heyting algebraM with op-
erator fK and lattice ordering ϕ ≤ ψ⇔ ⊢IPC ϕ→ ψ. In [2], it is shown that IEL
has the Disjunction Property. Thus,M has the Disjunction Property, i.e. f⊤ is the
smallest prime filter. We show that the conditions (iii)(a) and (iii)(c) of Definition
3.2 are satisfied. For every prime filter F , the set BEL(F ) := {ϕ | fK(ϕ) ∈ F} is
a filter because of the distribution axiom of IEL and the fact that⊤ → K⊤ is a the-
orem which ensures that fK(⊤) = K⊤ = ⊤ = f⊤ ∈ F and thus f⊤ ∈ BEL(F ).
Hence, (iii)(a) holds. Now suppose F is a prime filter and U is an ultrafilter such
that F ⊆ U . Since Kϕ → ¬¬ϕ is a theorem of IEL, we have Kϕ ≤ ¬¬ϕ.
Then ϕ ∈ BEL(F ) implies fK(ϕ) ∈ F implies ¬¬ϕ ∈ F implies ϕ ∈ U . Hence,
BEL(F ) ⊆ U . Thus, the truth conditions of an algebraic IEL-model as established
in Definitions 3.4 and 3.2 are satisfied. Let γ ∈MV be the assignment x 7→ x. By
induction on formulas, one shows γ(ϕ) = ϕ for every formula ϕ ∈ Fme. Then
(M, γ)  ϕ iff γ(ϕ) = ϕ = f⊤ = ⊤ iff ⊢IEL ϕ↔ ⊤ iff ⊢IEL ϕ.
Corollary 4.2. For every formula ϕ ∈ Fme, ⊢IEL ϕ⇔ IEL ϕ.
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Theorem 4.3. Let L be the logic L5, EL5, L5AC
−
N or L5
AC
N . For any set Φ∪ {ϕ}
of the respective object language, Φ ⊢L ϕ implies Φ L ϕ.
Proof. It suffices to consider logic L5ACN . Let M be an L5
AC
N -model and γ ∈
MV an assignment. We show that all axioms denote classically true propositions,
i.e. elements of ultrafilter TRUE . This is clear for (TND). We claim that the
remaining axioms denote the top element of the Heyting lattice. Then follows that
also rule (AN) is sound. Of course, all intuitionistic tautologies and substitution-
instances denote f⊤. Note that all other axioms are of the form: ϕ → ψ. Since
γ(ϕ → ψ) = f→(γ(ϕ), γ(ψ)) = f⊤ iff γ(ϕ) ≤ γ(ψ), it is enough to show that
(*) γ(ϕ) ≤ γ(ψ) holds true. For this purpose, it might be more comfortable to use
Theorem 3.5 instead of the model definitions. Concerning the axioms (i)–(v), (*)
follows from condition (B): for anym ∈ M , either f(m) = f⊤ or f(m) = f⊥.
Referring to axiom (xi), (*) follows by truth condition (B) along with the first
assertion of Lemma 3.3: fCG(f⊤) = f⊤. Concerning the remaining axioms, (*)
follows from corresponding conditions given in Theorem 3.5. Finally, rule (MP)
is sound because TRUE is a filter. The assertion of the Theorem now follows by
induction on derivations.
Completeness of the logics L5 and EL5 w.r.t. algebraic semantics is shown in
[10] and [11], respectively. Following the same strategy, we sketch out a complete-
ness proof of L5ACN w.r.t. the class of L5
AC
N -models. It is enough to show that every
consistent set of formulas is satisfied by some interpretation based on an L5ACN -
model. Let Φ ⊆ Fm be consistent. By Zorn’s Lemma, Φ has a maximal consistent
extension Ψ . We construct a model for Ψ . Let ≈Ψ be the relation on formulas de-
fined by ϕ ≈Ψ ψ :⇔ Ψ ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ. Using the Substitution Principle (SP), one shows
that ≈Ψ is a congruence relation on the resulting ‘algebra of formulas’, where the
connectives, modal and epistemic operators are viewed as operations on Fm (cf
[10, 11]). For ϕ ∈ Fm, we denote by ϕ := ϕΨ the congruence class of ϕ modulo
≈Ψ. Then the setsM = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fm} and TRUE = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Ψ} along with the
following operations on M : f⊥ := ⊥, f⊤ := ⊤, f(ϕ) := ϕ, fKi(ϕ) := Kiϕ,
fCG(ϕ) := CGϕ, f∗(ϕ,ψ) := ϕ ∗ ψ, where ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}, are all well-defined.
We claim that this yields an L5ACN -model M. Clearly, M is based on a Heyting
algebra: all IPC -theorems of the form ϕ↔ ψ are contained in Ψ . Then rule (AN)
implies Ψ ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ, i.e. ϕ = ψ, hence all equations that determine a Heyting al-
gebra are satisfied. TRUE ⊆M is an ultrafilter because Ψ is maximal consistent.
By Lemma 2.2(d), for anym ∈M : f(m) ∈ TRUE iffm = f⊤. The axioms (iv)
and (v) then ensure truth condition (ii) of a model, cf. Definition 3.2. Truth condi-
tion (i), the Disjunction Property, now follows by axiom (i). From Lemma 2.3(b) it
follows thatKi⊤ and CG⊤ are theorems. This, along with the distribution axioms,
implies that the sets BELi(F ) and COMMONG(F ) are filters, for any prime filter
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F of the Heyting algebra. Also the remaining truth conditions (iii)(c)–(g) of an
L5ACN -model follow straightforwardly from corresponding axioms. As in similar
situations, it might be more comfortable to use Theorem 3.5 here to verify all these
conditions. Let γ ∈MV be the assignment defined by x 7→ x. Then γ(ϕ) = ϕ, for
every ϕ ∈ Fm. Thus, ϕ ∈ Ψ ⇔ ϕ ∈ TRUE ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ (M, γ)  ϕ.
In particular, (M, γ)  Φ ⊆ Ψ . Hence, every set consistent in L5ACN is satisfied by
an L5ACN -model; and analogously for L5, EL5 and L5
AC−
N .
Theorem 4.4 (Completeness). Let L be the logic L5, EL5, L5AC
−
N or L5
AC
N . For
any set Φ ∪ {ϕ} of the respective object language, Φ L ϕ implies ΦL ⊢ ϕ.
5 Intended Models
Intuitively, by an intended model we mean a model where common knowledge has
its intended meaning, i.e. CGϕ is true iff
∧
n∈NE
n
Gϕ is true, for any formula ϕ
and any group G.18 Since infinite conjunctions cannot be expressed in the finitary
object language, our axiomatization ensures only that truth of CGϕ implies the
truth of all EnGϕ, n ∈ N. Thus, a non-intended model is a model where for some
formula ϕ, EnGϕ is true for every n ∈ N, but CGϕ is false. Both intended as well
as non-intended models exist as we shall see at the end of this section.
We would like to point out here that it is not unusual that the intended properties
of a formalized concept are not completely captured by the axiomatization but are
instead represented by a standard model or by certain intended models. The phe-
nomenon is well-known from classical first-order logic. Compactness arguments
generally show that a given first-order theory with infinite models has also models
with counter-intuitive or unexpected properties, non-standard elements, etc. The
existence of such non-intended (or non-standard) models is unproblematic as long
as enough intended and meaningful models exist.
In the following, we characterize intended L5AC
−
N - and L5
AC
N -models. For this
purpose, we adopt and apply some notions and results from [8] where common
knowledge is axiomatized and modeled in essentially the same way, although this
is done in a general, classical non-Fregean setting. In this section, by a model we
always mean an L5AC
−
N - or an L5
AC
N -model.
Definition 5.1. Let M be a model. For every i ∈ I and every group G, we put
BELi := BELi(TRUE) and COMMONG := COMMONG(TRUE), which are
the sets of propositions known by agent i, and the sets of propositions that are
common knowledge in G, respectively.
18Of course, this basic intuition also holds for our stronger introspective notion of common knowl-
edge which additionally has the property: CGϕ↔ CGCGϕ.
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Definition 5.2. Let M be a model, G be a group. We say that a set X ⊆ M of
propositions is closed under G if the following hold:
(a) X ⊆
⋂
i∈G BELi , i.e. the propositions of X are known by all agents of G,
(b) ifm ∈ X and i ∈ G, then fKi(m) ∈ X.
By GREATESTG we denote the greatest set closed under G, i.e. the union of all
sets which are closed under G.
Formally, the set COMMONG represents common knowledge in G. On the
other hand, the set GREATESTG captures the concept of common knowledge in
G in an intuitive way. Do these two sets coincide? By the definitions, we have:
Lemma 5.3. LetM be a model. For any group G, COMMONG is closed under
G. In particular, COMMONG ⊆ GREATESTG ⊆
⋂
i∈GBELi .
Relative to an interpretation (M, γ), common knowledge given as an infinite
conjunction according to (3) is expressed in the following way: (M, γ)  CGϕ
⇔ for all r ≥ 0 and for all sequences (i1, ..., ir) of agents of G, it holds that
(M, γ)  Ki1Ki2 ...Kirϕ.
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If ϕ ∈ Fm denotes the proposition m ∈M , i.e. γ(ϕ) = m, then that is equivalent
to: fCG(m) ∈ TRUE ⇔ for all r ≥ 0 and for all sequences (i1, ..., ir) of agents
of G, it holds that fKi1 (fKi2 (...(fKir (m))...)) ∈ TRUE .
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Definition 5.4. Suppose M is a model. Let m ∈ M and G be a group. We call
the set XG,m given by all elements fKi1 (fKi2 (...(fKir (m))...)), where r ≥ 0 and
(i1, i2, ..., ir) is any sequence of agents of G, the closure of m under G or the
G-closure ofm.
Lemma 5.5. Let M be a model. For any m ∈ M , fCG(m) ∈ TRUE implies
XG,m ⊆ TRUE .
Proof. Let fCG(m) ∈ TRUE , i.e. m ∈ COMMONG . Applying successively
truth condition (iii)(e) of a model (Definition 3.2), one recognizes that any element
fKi1 (fKi2 (...(fKir (m))...)) belongs to COMMONG , where i1, ..., ir ∈ G and
r ≥ 0. Hence, XG,m ⊆ COMMONG ⊆ TRUE , and the assertion follows.
The next result, also adopted from [8], gives a sufficient and necessary condi-
tion for common knowledge having the intended meaning in a given model (inde-
pendently of the fact whether we are dealing with the basic notion or with intro-
spective common knowledge).
19Of course, repetitions of agents are allowed in the sequences. For r = 0, we define
Ki1Ki2 ...Kirϕ := ϕ.
20Again, for r = 0 we let fKi1 (fKi2 (...(fKir (m))...)) := m.
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Theorem 5.6 ([8]). Let M be a model, G be a group. The following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) COMMONG = GREATESTG
(ii) For anym ∈M , fCG(m) ∈ TRUE iff XG,m ⊆ TRUE .
Proof. Let COMMONG = GREATESTG . By Lemma 5.5, we know that for
any m ∈ M , fCG(m) ∈ TRUE implies XG,m ⊆ TRUE . Suppose m ∈ M and
XG,m ⊆ TRUE . Then the G-closure of m, XG,m, is closed under G in the sense
of Definition 5.2. Since GREATESTG is the greatest set closed under G, we
have m ∈ XG,m ⊆ GREATESTG = COMMONG . Hence, fCG(m) ∈ TRUE
and (i) ⇒ (ii) holds true. Now, suppose (ii) holds true and m ∈ GREATESTG .
Since GREATESTG is closed under G, we have fKi1 (fKi2 (...(fKir (m))...)) ∈
GREATESTG , for any r ≥ 0 and any sequence (i1, i2, ..., ir) of agents of G.
Thus, XG,m ⊆ GREATESTG ⊆ TRUE . By (ii), fCG(m) ∈ TRUE , i.e. m ∈
COMMONG . Thus, GREATESTG ⊆ COMMONG and (i) follows.
Definition 5.7. A model is said to be an intended model if for each group G,
COMMONG = GREATESTG .
Corollary 5.8. LetM be a model. Suppose that for allm ∈M and all groups G,
the G-closure of m is finite (and thus its infimum exists) and the following holds:
fCG(m) ∈ TRUE ⇔
∧
XG,m ∈ TRUE . ThenM is an intended model.
Example 5.9. Simple examples of models are given by linearly ordered Heyting
algebras. Note that such Heyting algebras always have the Disjunction Property;
actually, all proper filters are prime. We modify and extend an example from [11].
It is based on the Heyting algebra over the closed interval M := [0, 1] of reals
with its usual linear ordering and the unique ultrafilter TRUE = (0, 1]. To agents
i = 1, 2, ..., N we assign elements b(1) < b(2) < ... < b(N) ∈ (0, 1), respec-
tively, and consider the prime filters BELi = {m ∈ M | b(i) ≤ m}. Then
BEL1 ) BEL2 ) ... ) BELN are the sets of propositions known by agent i,
respectively. We define fKi(m) := m if m ∈ BELi , and fKi(m) := 0 other-
wise. Then follows that BELi(F ) = F ∩ BELi , for any prime filter F . Thus,
each BELi(F ) is a filter contained in F , in accordance with the truth conditions
(iii)(a) and (iii)(c)* of Definitions 3.2 and 3.4. For each group G and m ∈ M ,
we define fCG(m) := fKiG (m), where iG ∈ G is the greatest number referring
to an agent of G. Then common knowledge in G is given by COMMONG =
BELiG =
⋂
{BELj | j ∈ G} and COMMONG(F ) = BELiG (F ) for any prime
filter F . Of course, we put f(1) := 1 and f(m) := 0 for 0 ≤ m < 1. Now
one recognizes that all truth conditions of an L5ACN -model are satisfied (use the
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Definitions 3.2 and 3.4 or/and Theorem 3.5). It is an intended model since for each
G, COMMONG is the greatest set closed under G: it is clear that COMMONG
is closed under G; and it is the greatest set with that property because for any
m ∈ M r COMMONG , we have m /∈ BELiG . Unfortunately, common knowl-
edge in G is trivial in the sense that it coincides with ‘everyone in G knows’:
EGϕ is true iff CGϕ is true. We modify the model in the following way. We only
change common knowledge in the group G = {1, ..., N} of all agents and leave
all other definitions as before. Let c be a real number such that b(N) < c < 1.
Then we consider COMMONG := {m ∈ M | m ≥ c} ( BELN and de-
fine fCG(m) := m if m ∈ COMMONG , and fCG(m) := 0 otherwise. Again,
one verifies that the resulting structure is an L5ACN -model. Since COMMONG
is a proper subset of BELN , common knowledge in G is no longer trivial, i.e. it
is strictly stronger than ‘everyone knows’. However, the resulting model is not
an intended one: COMMONG ( GREATESTG = BELN . Finally, we con-
struct an intended model with non-trivial common knowledge. For i = 1, ..., N ,
the sets BELi are defined as before. For the singleton group G = {1}, we put
COMMON{1} := BEL1 , and for any m ∈ M : fG(m) := fK1(m), with fK1
defined as below. For all other groups G, we define, with the same real number
c as above, COMMONG := P := {m ∈ M | m ≥ c}, and fCG(m) := m if
m ∈ P , and fCG(m) := 0 otherwise. Thus, all groups distinct from the single-
ton group {1} have exactly the same common knowledge given by the prime filter
P = {m ∈ M | m ≥ c} ( BELN . The fKi , i = 1, ..., N , are now defined in the
following way:
fKi(m) =


b1, ifm ∈ BELi r P
m, ifm ∈ P
0, else
Notice that for any agent i 6= 1, m /∈ P implies fKi(m) /∈ BELi . Thus, for
all groups G 6= {1}, P = {m ∈ M | m ≥ c} is the greatest closed set under
G. And for G = {1}, BEL1 = COMMON{1} is the greatest set closed under
G. Hence, the eventual model is an intended model. Of course, f is defined as
before. Similarly as in the previous example, one checks that all truth conditions
of an L5ACN -model are satisfied. Common knowledge in any group distinct from
the singleton {1} is not trivial, i.e. it is stronger than ‘everyone knows’: P is
a proper subset of each BELi . This model can be transformed into an intended
L5AC
−
N -model modifying for some G 6= {1} the function fCG in the following
way: Let d be a real such that 0 < d < c. Then define fCG(m) := m − d
if m ∈ COMMONG = P , and fCG(m) := 0 otherwise. Now there are some
m ∈ COMMONG such that fCG(m) /∈ COMMONG . Hence, the model cannot
be an L5ACN -model. But the truth conditions of an L5
AC−
N -model are still satisfied.
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